Market Solutions to Market Problems: Re-Examining Arbitral Immunity as a Solution to Unfairness in Securities Arbitration by Rutledge, Peter B.
Pace Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 1 Fall 2005 Article 5
September 2005
Market Solutions to Market Problems: Re-
Examining Arbitral Immunity as a Solution to
Unfairness in Securities Arbitration
Peter B. Rutledge
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter B. Rutledge, Market Solutions to Market Problems: Re-Examining Arbitral Immunity as a Solution
to Unfairness in Securities Arbitration, 26 Pace L. Rev. 113 (2005)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss1/5
Market Solutions to Market Problems: Re-Examining
Arbitral Immunity as a Solution to Unfairness in
Securities Arbitration
Peter B. Rutledge*
This paper addresses the fairness of securities arbitrations in the
United States. A few decades ago, such a topic would have been
relegated to the academic hinterlands. For the first fifty years following
the enactment of the nation's securities laws, pre-dispute arbitration
agreements between investors and the securities industry were not
enforceable.' In a series of decisions in the late 1980s, the Supreme
Court reversed course and held that such disputes were indeed
arbitrable. z Following those decisions, arbitration quickly became the
preferred method of dispute resolution for cases arising under the
nation's securities laws, especially disputes between investors and
broker-dealers. 3 Between 1990 and 2004, the number of arbitration cases
* Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America.
This paper is an adaptation of a presentation that I made during the Investor Rights
Symposium at Pace University Law School.
I would like to thank Dean William F. Fox for supporting this research through the
Dean's Research Grant program. Barbara Black, David Lipton and Deborah Masucci
provided valuable guidance during the development of this project. Participants at the
Investor Rights Symposium, especially Maureen Arellano Weston, provided thoughtful
commentary on the paper. Nicole Angarella, a stellar law student, provided excellent
research assistance. Steve Young, a research librarian at the Columbus School of Law,
supported this project through his unrivaled research skills. Some of these readers are
arbitrators themselves, so it is especially important for me to stress that the views
expressed herein are my own and not necessarily ones with which my readers agree;
nonetheless, they selflessly took the time to review the manuscript and offer objective
criticism of the proposal.
I previously developed the theory that animates this essay in another article. See Peter
B. Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Approach for Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA. L. REv. 151
(2004). I am grateful to the editors of the Georgia Law Review for permission to include
some of the material used in that article in this essay.
1. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
2. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). For a concise,
informative review of the key Supreme Court precedents in this area, see Joel Seligman,
The Quiet Revolution: Securities Arbitration Confronts the Hard Questions, 33 Hous. L.
REv. 327, 330-35 (1996).
3. See Michael A. Perino, Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission
Regarding Arbitrator Conflict Disclosure Requirements in NASD and NYSE Securities
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filed at the NASD rose from 3,617 to 8,201.4
As securities arbitration grew in popularity, concerns over the
fairness of securities arbitration proceedings quickly followed. Indeed,
the ink on the Supreme Court decisions had barely dried when Congress
tasked the General Accounting Office (GAO) with reporting on the
fairness of securities arbitrations.
The empirical premise of the "unfairness" critique has always been
hotly contested. The GAO did not find that investors were less likely to
prevail in industry-sponsored arbitral fora.6 More recent empirical
research has called into question claims that arbitration is unfair and that
arbitration is perceived as unfair.7 At the recent House subcommittee
hearing on securities arbitration, several industry representatives and
academics defended the basic contours of the present system.8 Former
SEC Chairman David Ruder noted during his keynote address at the
Arbitrations 3 (Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Perino Report] ("Securities arbitrations are the
primary dispute resolution mechanism for disputes involving customers and broker-
dealers.").
4. NASD Statistics are available at the organization's website, see
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS-GETPAGE&nodeld=516 (last visited
Jan. 5, 2006). The NYSE statistics show a more complex trend for a smaller set of cases.
In 2004, 972 cases were filed with the NYSE, an increase of the number of filings in
2000 but a decline compared to 2002 and 2003. See Arbitration Statistics, http://www.
nyse.com/pdfs/arbstatsl23104.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2006); see also Perino Report,
supra note 3, at 6-7.
5. General Accounting Office, Securities Arbitration: How Investors Fare (1992),
reprinted in 781 PRAc. L. INST. CORP. 19, 21 (July-Aug. 1992) [hereinafter GAO
Report].
6. Id. at 25-27.
7. See Gary Tidwell, et al., Party Evaluation of Arbitrators: An Analysis of Data
Collected from NASD Regulation Arbitrations, (Aug. 5, 1999) (copy on file with author)
(paper presented at the National Meeting of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business);
see also Report of the Arbitration Policy Task Force to the Board of Governors of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., reprinted in 95-96 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 85, 735 (1996) (finding securities arbitration generally "to be a relatively efficient,
fair, and less costly forum for resolution of disputes involving public investors, member
firms, and firm employees...") [hereinafter Ruder Report]. I recognize some of the
limitations of the Tidwell analysis, including the relatively low return rate on their survey
and the risk of a skewed sample pool (i.e., those participants displeased with the SRO
may be less likely to spend the time filling out a survey on it). These nuances about the
state of the data are beyond the scope of this paper.
8. Review of Securities Arbitration System: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprise, 109th Cong. (2005)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statements of Linda Feinberg, Karen Kupersmith & Michael
Perino).
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Investor Rights Symposium that securities arbitration is basically "fair." 9
Regardless of the validity of the "unfairness" criticism, it has
nonetheless influenced the debate in two important respects. First, as the
GAO noted, regardless of whether securities arbitrations are actually fair,
it is as important, if not more important, that securities arbitrations be
perceived as fair. Second, the "unfairness" critique has had a significant
effect on the development of the industry. Indeed, at the recent House
subcommittee hearing on the fairness of securities arbitration, NASD and
NYSE representatives seemed to be bending over backwards to
demonstrate how frequently the broker-dealers lost in securities
arbitrations and how they had designed procedures to enhance the
likelihood that investors would prevail.°
Lingering doubts over the fairness of securities arbitrations have led
to a variety of reforms since the Supreme Court first held that securities
law disputes are arbitrable." For example, doubts about the fairness of
the arbitrator nomination process prompted the NASD to reform that
process in 1998. Yet each set of reforms appears to be followed by a
new set of complaints about the newly reformed system.1 2 Even after the
1998 NASD reforms, observers continue to question whether those
reforms truly have made the arbitration appointment process fair.,
3
Recent hearings on the fairness of securities arbitrations before a House
Subcommittee show that reforms have not quelled criticism of the
system. 14
9. David Ruder, Keynote Address at the Pace Investor Rights Project: Investor
Rights Symposium (Mar. 31, 2005).
10. Hearings, supra note 8 (statements of Linda Feinberg & Karen Kupersmith).
11. Perino Report, supra note 3, at 9 (noting that "the SROs have regularly
revised their procedures over the last fifteen years.").
12. This was true even in the initial aftermath of McMahon. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). In 1989, the SEC "approved significant
changes in SRO rules but made it clear that it continued to have concerns about the
process." Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of
Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 991, 1001 (2002). "In sum, the SEC
and SRO have spent considerable time and effort since McMahon to amend procedural
rules governing securities arbitrations-all in the name of neutrality and fairness." Id. at
1005.
13. The NASD recently proposed further revisions to the process of generating
arbitrator lists in order to increase the randomness of selection. See Self Regulatory
Organizations: Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed
Rule Change and Amendment No. 1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51083 (Jan. 26,
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/34-51083.pdf.
14. Hearings, supra note 8 (statements of Public Investors Arbitration Bar
Association, William Francis Galvin & Daniel R. Solin).
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Most calls to reform securities arbitration suffer from a common
flaw-they have relied largely on regulatory solutions without
considering the market incentives of the arbitrators. When viewed
through an economic lens, the inefficacy of this "regulatory" approach
comes as no surprise. Calls for reform rest on a basic premise-that
securities arbitration is unfair because the system is "captured" by the
industry. If we accept that premise, then regulatory reforms are unlikely
to be an effective long-term solution. Such reforms may yield ephemeral
results as arbitrators and broker-dealers need time to react to shifting
norms. Over the long run, however, economic analysis suggests that
they will simply adapt their behavior to the new legal regime and,
eventually, new norms will develop that continue to give favored
treatment to the repeat players, namely the industry. Efforts to reform
the perceived inequities in securities arbitration need a fresh approach.
This essay provides that approach. It applies to the peculiar problem
of securities arbitration a theory that I developed in an Article in the
Georgia Law Review. 15 That Article developed an economic argument
against arbitral immunity. It proposed that we strip arbitrators and
arbitral institutions of any immunity that they enjoy as a matter of law.
In place of that immunity, contractual damages caps and liability waivers
would limit the exposure of arbitrators and arbitral institutions.
That same basic model provides a novel, viable and partly
efficacious solution to the (perceived) problem of unfairness in securities
arbitration. The effects of such a paradigm shift are subtle but important.
This model addresses many (but, admittedly, not all) of the most vexing
problems about unfairness in securities arbitration. It also better aligns
the incentives of arbitrators and arbitral institutions with the "public
interest" arguments that underpin calls for greater fairness in securities
arbitration.
I develop this argument in four parts. Part I catalogues the various
complaints about unfairness in securities arbitration. Part II sketches out
the liability model proposed here. Part III explains how this model
would address some of the complaints identified in Part I. Part IV
explores problems with and limitations on the liability model.
15. Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Approach for Arbitral Immunity, 39
GA. L. REv. 151 (2004).
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I. Complaints
Since the Supreme Court held securities law disputes to be
arbitrable, complaints about the fairness of the arbitration proceedings
have taken various forms. As Professor Gross noted during her
comments at the Investor Rights Symposium, many of these criticisms
were on display during the recent House subcommittee hearing on the
fairness of securities arbitration. 16 This Part classifies the main areas of
complaint-(1) complaints about arbitrator selection; (2) complaints
about arbitral procedure; and (3) complaints about arbitral awards. It
also analyzes various proposals for addressing those deficiencies and
identifies their weaknesses.
Some complaints about fairness concern arbitrator selection. One
complaint is that arbitrators are poorly trained. In a recent essay, Steven
Caruso argues that arbitrator training programs are inadequate. He finds
it "astounding how few of the experienced securities arbitration
practitioners know, or have otherwise personally experienced, the actual
'training' that is being provided to these individuals who will be
entrusted with the financial or professional lives of their clients.' 7
According to Caruso, the deficiencies in training include:
"little guidance [by the NASD] ... on the elements of the claims and/or
defenses that may be presented."
18
materials provided by the NYSE did not "provide[] any guidance
whatsoever on many of the critical issues that are present in nearly every
single customer initiated arbitration dispute."
' 19
The NASD requires no continuing education for arbitrators, and the NYSE
only requires minimal training.20
This combination of circumstances causes Caruso to conclude that
"it cannot, in all good conscience, be assumed that the members of any
given arbitration panel will have been fairly educated or trained on the
facts and circumstances that will be associated with the claims that we
16. Jill Gross, Comments at the Pace Investor Rights Project: Investor Rights
Symposium (Mar. 31, 2005) (discussing Hearings, supra note 8).
17. Steven B. Caruso, Model Arbitration Instructions: Luxury or Emerging
Necessity, 1440 PRAc. L. INST. CoRP. 465, 474-75 (2004); see also Ruder Report, supra
note 7, at 108-10 (calling for additional training of arbitrators in substantive law).
18. Caruso, supra note 17, at 475-76.
19. Id. at 477.
20. Id. at 478.
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will be asking them to decide., 21 As a solution, Caruso proposes that the
arbitral institutions develop "model arbitration instructions," analogous
to model jury instructions, which would guide the arbitrators'
deliberations.22
A second complaint is that the process of selecting arbitrators is not
sufficiently independent, a recurring theme in securities arbitration.23
For example, in NASD arbitrations, NASD staff traditionally selected
arbitrators from lists of "public" and "nonpublic" arbitrators. The
difference between the two is that "nonpublic" arbitrators have close
personal or professional relationships with the securities industry.
Following a review by an Arbitration Policy Task Force, the NASD
altered the method of selection (replacing selection by staff with a "list-
selection" method) but did not adopt the precise list-selection method
recommended by the task force and continued to employ the bifurcated
public/nonpublic classification scheme.24 Even after the NASD adopted
those recommendations, some experts continue to claim that arbitration
selection still remains unfair, accords too much discretion to NASD staff,
and does too little to dispel the perception of industry bias in securities
arbitration.25 Indeed, a recent report on securities arbitration found that
"[c]ritics of SRO arbitrations consistently point to the presence of
industry arbitrators on arbitration panels and the classification of
arbitrators as public or non-public as the primary sources of potential
pro-industry bias. 26 Proposals in this area range from eliminating the
21. Id.
22. Id. at 479-86.
23. For an exhaustive review of the NASD arbitrator selection process, see Cheryl
Nichols, Arbitrator Selection at the NASD: Investor Perception of a Pro-Securities
Industry Bias, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 63, 73-127 (1999).
24. See Perino Report, supra note 3, at 19-20. The Task Force proposed that the
NASD switch to a three-list system, consisting of public arbitrators qualified to be chairs,
public arbitrators not qualified to be chairs and industry arbitrators. See Ruder Report,
supra note 7, at 95.
25. See Nichols, supra note 23, at 132-34 (concluding that "[i]n situations where
there are questions about the impartiality of a decisionmaker, enhancing procedures to
select arbitrators will never be sufficient to assure participants that arbitrators are
independent."). Nichols calls for a "truly independent group" such as the American
Arbitration Association to administer the selection of arbitrators. Id. at 133-34. For a
similar view expressed even prior to the 1998 reforms, see Seligman, supra note 2, at 344
("If securities arbitration is to be mandatory, the opportunity for investors to at least
preserve the right to arbitration before a nonindustry forum strikes me as the most
promising alternative to the Ruder Task Force proposal for what is, in essence,
mandatory arbitration."). The NASD recently proposed further revisions to the arbitrator
nomination process to increase its randomness. See Perino Report, supra note 3, at 9.
26. Perino Report, supra note 3, at 19.
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use of nonpublic arbitrators to strengthening the limits on industry
participants.
A final complaint concerning arbitrator selection is that arbitrators
themselves display a bias towards the securities industry.27 As Michael
Perino and others have observed, the empirical evidence for that bold
claim is thin.28 Nonetheless, this sentiment appears to be the driving
force behind California's adoption of rigorous disclosure rules for
arbitrations in that state.29 Under the California rules, which currently
are the subject of substantial litigation by the securities industry, a party
may disqualify an arbitrator on the basis of a wide array of conflicts.
30
Courts must vacate awards if the arbitrator has failed to disclose a known
disqualifying conflict or fails to disqualify himself at a party's request
due to such a conflict.3' Moreover, pursuant to the California law, the
Judicial Council adopted a series of Ethics Standards applicable to all
contractual arbitrations taking place in that state.32 Those standards set
forth certain disclosure obligations (which may lead to an arbitrator's
disqualification) and, if unheeded, can result in vacatur of the award.33
A second category of complaints about the fairness of securities
arbitration concerns the procedures following the arbitrator's
nomination.34 These complaints take a variety of forms. One complaint
is that there is too little discovery in securities arbitration (thereby
depriving a plaintiff with a potentially meritorious claim of the
27. See Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do
Brokerage Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CiN. L. REv. 415, 448 (2003)
("[S]ome investors' attorneys believe that [the practice of including an industry
representative on SRO panels] builds in a pro-industry bias.").
28. Perino Report, supra note 3, at 3 ("[T]here is little if any indication that
undisclosed conflicts represent a significant problem in SRO-sponsored arbitrations.");
id. at 34-36 (summarizing data showing that "arbitration participants believe that their
arbitrations were fair and impartial."); see also Ruder Report, supra note 7, at 18
("[A]lthough many investor representatives claim that SRO sponsored securities
arbitration is unfair, neither the independent studies conducted, nor the statistics on the
results of customer-broker arbitrations, support this conclusion.").
29. See Perino Report, supra note 3, at 35 ("The California Ethics Standards are
primarily concerned with public perceptions on the fairness of arbitration proceedings.").
30. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9 (West 2005). On the litigation, see Credit
Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005); NASD Dispute
Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of Cal., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
31. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005).
32. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.85 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005); Ethics Standards
for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration, CAL. R. CT., Div. VI.
33. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005).
34. For a good summary of some of the procedural issues in arbitration that have
attracted criticism, see Black, supra note 27, at 445-49.
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documentation necessary to prove his case). Another is that arbitral fees
are excessive and outstrip the fees that one would normally bear to
commence a lawsuit in the court system.
A third category of fairness-related criticisms concerns the arbitral
awards themselves. These criticisms generally take two forms. One type
of criticism highlights the form of the award-securities arbitrators, until
quite recently, have not been required to provide written opinions (apart
from the measly requirements of the SROs) or to provide written reasons
for their awards.35 A second concerns how arbitrators apply the law (to
the extent that is discernible in a world where they do not provide
reasons for their awards).36 According to these criticisms, arbitrators do
not follow the law, misapply the law or reach unjust results.
Many of the reforms-whether proposed in the literature or
implemented by the institutions-have relied largely on regulatory
solutions. Each reflects a basic premise-that one set of rules can
remedy the shortcomings of another. But as each new wave of reforms is
followed by new claims of unfairness and calls for yet new rules, one
begins to wonder whether a "regulatory" approach is really the optimal
one. Particularly if we accept the oft-heard premise that the arbitral
system favors the industry (the repeat player in these disputes), then
regulatory reforms are unlikely to be an effective long-term solution.
Basic economics suggests that, over time, both the industry and the
agencies will adapt their behavior to the new legal regime, which is
perhaps precisely why each new wave of reforms is met with academic
criticism claiming that the reforms did not go far enough. Rather than
simply imposing a rule on arbitrators and institutions in an effort to reach
a desirable result, wouldn't it be better if we designed the market in a
way to give the players an incentive to reach those results on their own?
37
35. See Seth Lipner, Ideas Whose Time Has Come: The Single Arbitrator and
Reasoned Awards, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2000: TODAY'S TRENDS, PREDICTIONS FOR
ToMoRRow 659, 661 (David E. Robbins ed., Practising Law Institute 2000). The NASD
Board of Governors recently approved an amendment to its Code of Arbitration
Procedure giving parties the option of requesting a written explanation for the panel's
decision. See Press Release, NASD, New Arbitration Rule Requires Award Explanations
Upon Investor Request (Jan. 27, 2005), available at http://www.nasd.com
/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_013145.
36. For a good summary of these critiques, see Black, supra note 27, at 449-51.
37. For other pieces in the scholarly literature that identify how liability rules can
harness market forces to produce good results in arbitration, see Maureen A. Weston,
Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88
MINN. L. REv. 449 (2004); Susan Franck, The Liability of International Arbitrators: A
Comparative Analysis and Proposal for Qualified Immunity, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
[Vol. 26:113
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The next Part suggests how to harness such market mechanisms to
decouple the incentives of the industry parties from the incentives of the
arbitrators and arbitral institutions.
II. The Model
The model proposed here depends on stripping away the immunity
that arbitrators and arbitral institutions traditionally have enjoyed. All
arbitrators, including those in the securities industry, enjoy an absolute
immunity from civil actions for damages provided that they perform
arbitral acts within their jurisdiction. 38 This immunity is extremely broad
and covers a variety of wrongful acts, ranging from legal errors39 to bad
faith misconduct.40  Arbitral institutions such as the NASD and the
NYSE also enjoy a broad immunity from civil action. This also covers a
wide range of wrongful acts, ranging from mishandling of the arbitrator's
appointment4' to acting contrary to its own rules.
42
I propose that we strip arbitrators and arbitral institutions of this
immunity. The limitations on an arbitrator's and arbitral institution's
immunity from suit should no longer depend on a legal rule imposed as a
regulatory matter. Instead, the immunity, if any, should come in the
form of contractual liability waivers negotiated between the parties, the
arbitrators and where appropriate, the institution. 43 Elsewhere, I have
sketched out the economic analysis supporting this model, and, in the
interest of brevity, do not repeat that analysis here.44 Instead, I offer its
COMP. L. 1, 7-8 (2000); Andrew Guzman, Arbitrator's Liability: Reconciling Arbitration
and Mandatory Rules, 49 DuKE L.J. 1279 (2000).
38. For a recent decision extending arbitral immunity to the arbitrators and
administering institution, see Prudential Bache Secs. (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. NASD Dispute
Resolution, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
39. See, e.g., Arthur A. Chaykin, The Liabilities of Mediators: A Hostile
Environment for Model Legislation, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 47, 66 (1986).
40. 1 MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 31:17 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
41. Theile v. RML Realty Partners, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 416, 417 (Ct. App. 1993).
42. Olson v. NASD, 85 F.3d 381, 382 (8th Cir. 1996).
43. In practice, parties may be unlikely to negotiate with the arbitrator directly over
the immunity rule (though this is perhaps more likely in ad hoc arbitration). Instead, any
contractual limit on liability likely is to be incorporated by reference to the institutional
rules governing arbitration. While some might argue that this will simply amount to a
contract of adhesion over which the parties have no choice, this does not follow as a
theoretical matter, for, as I explain below, arbitrators and arbitral institutions may choose
to compete along this criterion by offering a menu of options to the parties. I am grateful
to Barbara Black for her critique of this point.
44. Rutledge, supra note 15, at 151.
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highlights and explain how it would operate.
I have previously explained that, in thinking about issues of
immunity, we should distinguish between two forms.45 First, there is
"legal immunity." Legal immunity means an immunity from civil suits
for monetary damages that is imposed by operation of law, regardless of
the parties' expectations. In the United States, it provides an absolute bar
to liability for the arbitrator and the administering institution, provided
that they are performing arbitral acts and acting within their
jurisdiction-relatively simple conditions as courts have interpreted
them. Second, there is "contractual immunity." Contractual immunity
means immunity from civil suit for monetary damages that applies as a
result of a term of the arbitrator's mandate, either expressly negotiated
with the parties or, more frequently, incorporated into their arbitration
agreement by reference to an institution's rules. Most of the major
arbitral institutions, including the NASD and NYSE, contain some form
of contractual immunity in their institutional rules. My proposal merely
requires courts (which are generally the progenitors of arbitral immunity)
to strip away "legal immunity." As I discuss below, arbitrators and
arbitral institutions remain free to limit their liability through contractual
arrangements that cap damages or waive liability to the extent permitted
by law.
How would the proposal operate? It would essentially put
arbitrators and arbitral institutions on the same level playing field as all
other professionals.46 Has the arbitrator or the arbitral institution acted in
a reasonable manner? In making the reasonableness determination, a
court may take into account professional norms that influence the
reasonableness standard, much as it would do in an ordinary malpractice
case.
47
Consider the simplest case such as the arbitrator's or the
institution's breach of an arbitral rule. In the event that the arbitrator
failed to heed a rule, the aggrieved party could sue her, a remedy
unavailable under current law. Damages, as in any other tort suit, would
be tied to the harm suffered by the party and caused by the arbitrator's
misconduct. While current law gives the arbitrator little incentive to
45. Id. at 156-58.
46. One of the theoretical justifications for arbitral immunity is that arbitrators are
the functional equivalent of judges who themselves are entitled to an absolute immunity
from civil suit for monetary damages. Id. As I have explained elsewhere, this analogy
between arbitrators and judges breaks down on closer comparison.
47. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS HoRNBOOK SERIES § 122 (2000).
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"take care" that her duties be executed, the proposal here gives her an
incentive to exercise greater care in the discharge of her duties.
Now consider a harder case. A variety of doctrines allow arbitrators
and arbitral institutions to exercise jurisdiction over non-signatories to an
arbitration agreement.4 s Those doctrines are highly controversial, for
they derogate from the fundamental principle that arbitration is the
product of voluntary contractual relations among the parties to an
underlying agreement. Aggressive expansion of those doctrines risks
dragging unwitting parties before a tribunal to whose jurisdiction they
have not consented and yet whose judgment ultimately may bind them.
Under current law, however, arbitral immunity shields the arbitrator and
the arbitral institution from liability even if they erroneously concluded
that they could exercise jurisdiction over the non-signatory. 49 At present,
the only remedy to the aggrieved party may be a vacatur action under the
Federal Arbitration Act, which hardly "makes whole" the party who has
had to bear the cost of participating in an arbitration to which he did not
consent. Under the proposal here, the non-signatory dragged into the
arbitration through an unduly aggressive exercise of jurisdiction would
have a remedy against the arbitrator and the arbitral institution. Unlike
the prior example, any liability waivers would not apply because the non-
signatory, by definition, has never consented to the terms of the
arbitration. The upshot, then, would be to reduce aggressive expansions
of the non-signatory doctrine.
Finally, consider perhaps the most difficult case, an arbitrator who
reaches a substantively erroneous result-awarding relief to a party on
the basis of an erroneous understanding of the governing legal principle.
Here too, the only remedy currently available to the party aggrieved by
the decision is vacatur of the award, which may provide the party relief
from an adverse judgment but does not provide full relief. The aggrieved
party may have had valid counterclaims, which the arbitrator did not
credit. Or the party may have been forced to endure a more protracted
proceeding than necessary if the arbitrator, applying the correct legal
principle, could have resolved the case at an earlier stage (such as non-
arbitrability or a statute of limitations defense). Under the proposal here,
48. For a report on recent decisions in this area, see Barbara Black, Arbitration
Update Survey of Recent Significant (Mostly) Securities Arbitration Decisions Spring
2004, 1440 PRAc. L. INST. CoRp. 61, 73-74 (2004).
49. See, e.g., Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 144-50 (1st Cir. 2003)
(summarizing various theories under which arbitration may have jurisdiction over non-
signatories).
11
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the party aggrieved by a substantively erroneous decision would have an
action against the arbitrator for that result.
This Part has sketched out the contours of a regime without legal
immunity for arbitrators and arbitral institutions. The next Part applies
that model to show how it addresses some of the perceived problems of
fairness in securities arbitration that were identified in Part I.
III. Benefits of the Model
Part I of this Essay organized critiques about securities arbitration
into three basic clusters: (1) complaints about arbitrator selection; (2)
complaints about unfair procedures and (3) complaints about erroneous
or unjust results. This Part shows how an arbitration regime without
immunity effectively addresses the first and third problems and partly
addresses the second problem.
Stripping arbitrators and arbitral institutions of their immunity
would go far toward addressing complaints about arbitrator selection. To
the extent that the complaint concems the quality and training of
arbitrators, a world of potential liability should ensure a stronger pool of
arbitrators. Those arbitrators who doubt their abilities or do not train
with sufficient seriousness will have a strong disincentive to continue
their participation in the industry, for fear of engaging in an act that will
result in liability. By contrast, the regime should appeal to those
arbitrators with sufficient confidence in their abilities to avoid a "liability
producing event., 50 Moreover, institutions, stripped of their immunity,
would have a greater incentive to monitor the quality of existing and
potential arbitrators, particularly under systems such as the NASD's
where the institution is involved in their recruitment and, occasionally,
their selection.51
Moreover, the prospect of liability could have very salutary effects
50. See Guzman, supra note 37, at 1303.
5 1. Theoretically, for similar reasons, the model could be expected to promote
competition among arbitral institutions as well. Historically, however, securities
arbitration has not been marked by substantial competition among providers. As one
veteran observed to me during the Investor Rights Symposium, the NASD is "the only
game in town." A few years ago, the NASD tried a pilot project that allowed securities
arbitration participants to use other forums. Despite this opportunity, nearly all
participants continued to opt for the NASD. In my view, even if the market has not
historically proven amenable to competition, removing barriers such as immunity is
nonetheless desirable as it creates the conditions to competition and enables future
competitors to enter the market more easily. I am especially grateful to Barbara Black for
her comments on this point.
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for the supply of potential arbitrators. New entrants to the market
encounter an obvious "bonding" problem-how can they develop a
sufficient reputation for themselves so as to persuade parties and/or
arbitral institutions to nominate them? Stripping arbitrators of immunity
overcomes this problem.52 New entrants can compete by offering their
services without requiring liability waivers. In essence, they could signal
to potential "purchasers" a sufficient confidence in their abilities that
they are unlikely to engage in a "liability producing event." The same
holds true for arbitral institutions-as they attempt to compete for a share
of the "arbitral" or dispute resolution marketplaces, they can seek to
differentiate themselves from other providers of dispute resolution
services along this axis.
Stripping arbitrators and arbitral institutions of their immunity does
a relatively less effective job at addressing the "unfair procedures"
problem. It does not affect arbitrator's power to order discovery. Nor
does it directly address the complaints about fees. In one respect,
however, the proposal here does have a salutary effect on arbitral
procedures. It provides a greater incentive for arbitrators and arbitral
institutions to ensure that they observe the governing law and rules. As
noted above, the current regime of legal immunity protects arbitrators
and arbitral institutions even when they have violated their own rules
(and a surprising number of reported opinions raise this problem).53
Stripping them of that immunity provides an incentive for both entities to
ensure that their rules (the ones that have been incorporated by reference
into the parties' agreement) are in fact observed.
Stripping arbitrators and arbitral institutions of their immunity
should improve the quality of awards. As noted above, one of the main
critiques of securities arbitration is that securities arbitrators often do not
provide written opinions or reasons for their awards.54 Stripping them of
immunity provides them a greater incentive not to ignore these steps. An
52. See Stephen J. Choi, The Problem With Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1233, 1238 (2003) ("Imposing liability on arbitrators and arbitral
institutions.., provides one possible mechanism of ensuring arbitrator fidelity without
resorting to high-cost reputational bonding.").
53. See Weston, supra note 37, at 491-93.
54. Black & Gross, supra note 12, at 991, 1000. Recent proposed changes to the
arbitral rules may increase the number of written opinions. See Press Release, NASD,
New Arbitration Rule Requires Award Explanations Upon Investor Request (Jan. 27,
2005), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS _GETPAGE&ss
DocName=NASDW_013145; Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual
Arbitration, CAL. R. CT., Div. VI.
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arbitrator who does not provide a written opinion or reasons for his
award runs the risk of having to justify that award in a subsequent
lawsuit where the basis for his decision is challenged. By contrast, an
arbitrator who provides a written opinion and reasons for his award has
provided a clearer set of justifications for his decision which, so long as
they are defensible, will avoid the suit that challenges whether the
arbitrator has discharged his duty.55  Even if a risk-averse arbitrator
believes that he is more likely to avoid liability by not providing a
written opinion, the specter of liability still will give the arbitrator a
greater incentive to make sure that, before he files his awards, he can
justify his ruling if he is called to account for it. Finally, regardless of
the arbitrator's incentives, stripping institutions of liability enhances their
incentives to police arbitrators' awards for quality before they are filed.
56
This Part has evaluated whether abolition of the immunity doctrine
would effectively address the perceived problems with securities
arbitration. The next Part addresses some of the anticipated criticisms of
the thesis.
IV. Problems With/Limitations on the Model
The proposal offered here surely will invite criticism. This Part
anticipates and responds to some of the most likely critiques. I focus on
four: (1) the proposal's effect on the market's viability; (2) its effect on
vexatious litigation; (3) the workability of its standard of care; and (4) its
effect on review of awards.
The most obvious complaint is that stripping arbitrators and arbitral
institutions would simply shut down the industry. The risk of liability
would deter arbitral institutions from accepting cases. So too would it
deter potential arbitrators from entering the industry.
Such an argument is flawed in several respects. Initially, it is
empirically wrong. Securities arbitration is not suffering from a shortage
of decision makers.57  This is unsurprising. Service as an arbitrator
provides more benefits than the mere fees that they receive for service.
In addition to the fees, arbitrators also derive a host of non-monetary
55. For a discussion of how liability rules can enhance substantive results of awards,
see Guzman, supra note 37, at 1319-20.
56. I am especially grateful to David Lipton for challenging my arguments on this
point.
57. See Caruso, supra note 17, at 472 ("There are thousands-if not tens of
thousands-of individuals who are presently approved to serve as arbitrators at the
NASD and NYSE.").
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benefits from service: (1) they develop a reputation for expertise that
leads to further opportunities to gain clients whom they can represent in
subsequent arbitrations; (2) they may develop a reputation for expertise
that leads to future appointments as arbitrators either in higher stakes
arbitrations or in non-SRO arbitrations where fees are higher; (3) their
service may lead to future professional opportunities on task forces, in
conferences or other forums which themselves lead to future clients or
arbitrator appointments.58
At the Investors Rights Symposium, we traced through the
implications of this argument in greater detail and came to the conclusion
that the model might well replace the current system of a large number of
minimally compensated arbitrators with a new system consisting of a
cadre of well compensated, professional arbitrators like those who
operate in other industries. If we assume that stripping arbitrators of
immunity would lead to a net exit from the market, such an exit would
constrict the supply of available arbitrators. A reduction in supply would
drive up the price of each arbitrator. The more lucrative compensation
would give potential arbitrators a greater incentive to take on more cases
and, in the long run, lead to a pool of professional, potentially full-time
arbitrators. As explained below, these arbitrators also would have a
greater incentive to "take care" in the discharge of their duties.
Moreover, the experience of other industries with liability rules
suggests that collapse of the industry would not follow. By the logic of
this argument, no industry could survive under the specter of liability.
Yet, contrary to the argument, most industries-whether lawyers,
accountants, or any other profession-thrive despite the specter of
liability for their misdeeds.5 9 As with any other industry, arbitrators and
arbitral institutions can rely on market mechanisms to limit their
potential exposure.
The most obvious strategy would be to employ liability waivers, as
many industries do. Such waivers would accomplish some of the goals
currently achieved by immunity. Yet they would differ from the
immunity rule in two respects. First, liability waivers, unlike immunity,
would not be absolute-basic principles of tort law teach that such
waivers cannot excuse liability for intentional, reckless or, in some cases,
58. On the reputational incentives of arbitrators, see Guzman, supra note 37, at
1303.
59. See Weston, supra note 37, at 510 ("No other private professional exercising
difficult discretionary functions or services is so immune.").
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grossly negligent torts.60 Second, the liability waivers, unlike immunity,
would not be universal. Either arbitral institutions or, more likely,
arbitrators may choose to compete in the market by not requiring liability
waiver as a condition for their performance; their willingness to expose
themselves to liability thereby functions as a sort of "reputational
bonding," which may be particularly important for new entrants.
A second strategy short of liability waivers may be damages caps.
One logical cap in the typical SRO arbitration may be to limit damages
to the arbitrators' fee. Arbitrators in SRO arbitrations, as opposed to
arbitrations before the AAA or ICC, receive relatively modest stipends
for their participation in daily hearings. 62 Tying the limit of arbitrators'
exposure to the amount of their fee provides a new incentive for
arbitrators to "take care" in the execution of their duties while not
presenting them with such potential exposure that it far outweighs their
"gain" from serving as an arbitrator.
To the extent liability waivers and damages caps do not enable
providers adequately to manage their risk, insurance presents a third and
final strategy. Such insurance schemes are quite familiar to the
professional services industry (consider legal malpractice insurance).
Arbitration is a particularly well positioned industry to enter the
insurance market. Many arbitrators affiliate with particular institutions
(e.g., AAA, NASD, JAMS), and those institutions, working in
conjunction with the insurers, could calculate risk premiums for the
market participants. Additionally, the insurers would provide an
additional bonding mechanism for the industry, as they would have a
keen financial interest in assessing the risk that an arbitrator or institution
might produce a "liability producing event," much like they currently
calibrate health or automobile insurance premiums to the risk factors of a
particular insured or class of insureds.63
A second criticism about the proposal is that it would induce
vexatious litigation. The argument goes as follows: litigants before the
tribunal would use the threat of litigation to influence the outcome; a
60. See DOBBS, supra note 42, § 212.
61. In this respect, my proposal may well converge with Professor Weston's
proposal of qualified immunity. See Weston, supra note 37, at 449. Our proposals differ
in at least one important respect. Where Professor Weston relies on a regulatory rule to
achieve this state of affairs, I am willing to rely on the market to decide whether this-or
some other-state of affairs is optimal.
62. Perino Report, supra note 3, at 16.
63. On the effect of liability for the arbitrator's tolerance of risk, see Guzman, supra
note 37, at 1326-29.
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risk-averse arbitrator would be more prone to craft his award in favor of
the party more likely to bring a suit; to the extent a party is dissatisfied
with the outcome, he may choose to retaliate against the arbitrator
through litigation even if such litigation is not meritorious simply in
order to extract a settlement. To the extent one believes that securities
arbitration is biased in favor of the industry (as the more powerful
player), arbitration without immunity is likely to exacerbate the problem
by encouraging the industry to employ heavy-handed tactics against
uncooperative arbitrators.
Such a criticism is more formidable than the former one, but several
responses are possible.64  First, it would not be in the long-term
economic interest of the industry to pursue such a strategy. Vexatious
litigation harms the industry, the repeat player in the litigation. A
rational arbitrator faced with a vexatious litigant as a party either would
decline to hear the case or would demand some type of premium to
protect himself against the prospect of a future lawsuit. Such a market
response would either force the vexatious litigant to adjust its behavior or
eventually drive the vexatious litigant out of the market; no arbitrator
would be willing to sit for a case involving such a party.6 5
Second, it is not necessarily in arbitrators' interest to calibrate their
award in favor of a particular party. Arbitrators may wish to develop a
reputation for independence.66 Such a reputation carries with it two
potential benefits-the opportunity to be named as chairman in future
three-arbitrator panels and the opportunity to be named as the sole
arbitrator in single-arbitrator panels. In both securities and non-securities
arbitration, this degree of independence is a necessary prerequisite for
such an appointment. An arbitrator who cultivates too great a reputation
as an industry-friendly decision maker runs the risk of being excluded
from such potentially lucrative appointments, either as a result of a
formal classification or, in the case of SROs, having the investor strike
his name from the list of possible arbitrators.
Finally, to the extent that either of the two prior predictions proves
wrong (and I recognize that both are subject to empirical testing), courts
64. For one response, see id. at 1324-25.
65. A slight variant on this criticism is to claim that the vexatious repeat litigant
might not be the industry player but instead a particularly combative member of the
highly sophisticated investor-side bar. This presents a different challenge for the model,
for the client of the vexatious investor attorney might well bear the cost of her counsel's
reputation for litigiousness. Nonetheless, I think that the other responses given in this
section may address the problem of the vexatious investor's counsel.
66. See Guzman, supra note 37, at 1303.
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have other tools at their disposal to deter vexatious litigation. Barbara
Black identifies a number of these tools in her important essay on the
ironic effort by some brokerage firms to use the courts as an antidote to
arbitration. These tools include requiring the brokerage firm to post a
bond, disciplinary actions by the SRO against a firm that brings a
frivolous motion and more aggressive use of Rule 11 sanctions under the
FRCP.67 While Black discusses these tools in the context of deterring
industry over-reliance on vacatur actions, the logic of her argument
supports use of some of these tools as a mechanism for deterring
vexatious litigation by industry parties against arbitrators.
A third criticism is that the standard of care would be unworkable,
especially in cases where the gravamen of the complaint against the
arbitrator is that he did not correctly apply the law. This line of
argument is suggested by an important recent article by Barbara Black
and Jill Gross.68  The argument would run as follows: securities
arbitrators do not necessarily follow the law; sometimes, the law is
complex; sometimes, arbitrators explicitly depart from the law and apply
principles of equity.69 Stripping arbitrators of immunity lays a trap for
them because they may not know ex ante exactly what the proper
standard of care is and, therefore, even well-meaning arbitrators may fall
into a liability trap.
There is some force to this argument, but it overlooks the substantial
benefits to be derived through stripping arbitrators of immunity. In a
world without immunity, arbitrators have less of an incentive to discern
precisely the governing law and the scope of their discretion (if any) to
67. Black, supra note 27, at 444.
68. Cf Black & Gross, supra note 12, at 1006-30. In fairness to Black and Gross,
they do not direct this argument at the proposal made here. Indeed, some of their
analysis, discussed below, actually supports it. I simply wish to give them special
acknowledgement here because their article spawned my thinking about this potential
criticism.
69. At the Investor Rights Symposium, some participants took issue with this
argument. They claimed that securities arbitration is better off because arbitrators do not
feel strictly bound to apply the law and instead may appeal to principles of equity and
conscience in reaching what they believe to be a just decision. Further conversation led
me to conclude that we simply had a philosophical difference here. Contrary to those
observers, I do not believe that arbitration inherently contains a license for the private
decision maker to depart from the legal principles governing the resolution of the dispute.
Certainly, there are cases of arbitrators deciding cases ex aequo et bono, but those
principles in my view should only apply where the parties expressly have authorized their
use. Otherwise, I think arbitration risks becoming unbounded both from the rule of law
and from the parties' agreement. I am grateful to Barbara Black for pushing my thinking
on this point.
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apply equitable principles to resolve the case. Despite the assurances of
the Supreme Court in McMahon, the "manifest disregard of the law"
standard is toothless and, as a consequence, "there is no meaningful
review of arbitrator awards to assure arbitrators are applying the law.
70
The specter of liability provides the arbitrator (like any other
professional) a powerful economic incentive to "drill down" into the
applicable law to ensure that the reasoning supporting his or her decision
is airtight-not simply the choice of governing legal principles but also
their application. In this respect, far from creating a trap for the
arbitrator, a world without immunity can, I submit, be expected to
improve the quality of decisions because arbitrators no longer can avoid
71the thorny issues.
A final, perhaps the strongest, attack on my proposal is that a world
without immunity will encourage disgruntled parties to use suits against
the arbitrator as the basis for a collateral attack on the award. I
previously have answered this criticism in a general context and can
advance additional answers in the securities context7 2  Initially, it is
important to note that the collateral attack problem only will affect a
small subset of cases. It only applies to those cases where a party has a
complaint about the substance of the award, not those where the
complaint is based on misconduct by the arbitrator or the institutions
(such as missing a deadline).73 Moreover, within that subset, the grounds
for vacatur are themselves extremely narrow, and the opportunity for
judicial review of the award's substance virtually non-existent (apart
70. Black & Gross, supra note 12, at 1030. On the toothlessness of the manifest
disregard standard, see id. at 1031-35; see also Black, supra note 27, at 434-39.
71. There is, I suppose, a collateral problem about an arbitrator acting in good faith
and simply being unaware of the governing legal or equitable rule. Those cases,
however, are not problematic in my view. To the extent that the party has brought the
governing rule to the arbitrator's attention, then it is entirely appropriate to hold the
arbitrator accountable if he or she has proceeded to ignore it (as is the case right now in
the manifest disregard of the law doctrine). On the other hand, if the parties have not
brought the rule to the arbitrator's attention in their briefing, then I believe waiver
doctrines should shield the arbitrator. Cf Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty.) Ltd., 181 F.3d
435, 440-41 (3d Cir. 1999). Just as arbitrators cannot be bound by choice-of-law
arguments to the extent that parties do not raise them in a timely fashion, so too can it not
be "unreasonable" for them not to rely on such rules in crafting their awards.
72. Rutledge, supra note 15, at 175-76.
73. As I see these issues, it is only the substantive attacks that present the risk. Other
complaints such as missed deadlines or failure to observe the institutional rules do not
provide a basis for vacating the arbitral award. As a result, suits on these grounds would
not present the collateral attack problem. I am grateful to Barbara Black for pushing my
thinking on this point.
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from the toothless "manifest disregard of the law" doctrine).
Consequently, this criticism only will affect a narrow set of cases where
the arbitrator allegedly has engaged in misconduct that might also
provide a basis for vacating the arbitral award. Furthermore, as already
explained above, a regime with immunity should give arbitrators an
incentive to reach more legally defensible results. Finally, to the extent
collateral attacks would occur, courts have mechanisms at their disposal
to ensure that any suit against the arbitrator does not become satellite
litigation against the award. For example, courts may exercise their
equitable discretion to stay the suit against the arbitrator until the
aggrieved party has completed any vacatur action on the award.
Conclusion
Ever since the Supreme Court held that securities disputes were
arbitrable, questions have lingered over the fairness of those arbitrations.
In the nearly two decades since the Supreme Court's decisions, observers
have proposed, and the industry has implemented, a variety of reforms
aimed at addressing actual or perceived unfairness of securities
arbitrations. At bottom, however, these proposals remain mired in the
belief that one can achieve "fairness" in an industry through regulation
rather than market forces. The proposal here-stripping arbitrators and
arbitral institutions of their legal immunity from suit-represents one
effort at tapping market forces to achieve the desired fairness. Such a
result has salubrious effects on the supply of arbitrators, the content of
awards, and, partly, the procedures employed in the arbitration. Nor is
this proposal simply an academic pipe dream-most of the rules
according arbitrators and arbitral institutions' legal immunity derive from
judge-made law, and thus can be undone through judicial decision as
well.74 To be sure, such a proposal is controversial and not free from
criticism, yet many of those criticisms can be met. Consequently, a
world without legal immunity might well yield a net benefit for securities
arbitration.
74. E.g., Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (Ct. App. 1983).
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